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Abstract
This paper constructs a model where two firms simultaneously choose
their time of entry into a market. Under sequential entry, the second entrant is assumed to face a lower entry cost because of positive externalities
from the first firm’s entry. The model generates sequential entry if the magnitude of the externality is large relative to the post-entry duopoly profit,
and simultaneous entry otherwise. In a sequential entry equilibrium, the
first entrant fares better than the second and the second entrant does not
necessarily enter too late from the viewpoint of social welfare. When firms
have diﬀerent costs of production, the eﬃcient firm is more likely to enter
first.
Keywords: Entry, Externality, Duopoly
JEL Classification: L13, D43, C72

1. Introduction
Initial entrants into a market often generate positive externalities for subsequent
entrants: for example, the latter can lower their cost of entry by avoiding mistakes
made by the former. The presence of such cost-lowering externalities for late
comers makes it attractive for firms to postpone their entry. In such a situation,
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each potential entrant faces a trade-oﬀ between entering earlier than its rivals and
enjoying monopoly status till additional entry occurs versus waiting and entering
later in order to lower its entry cost. This paper formalizes this trade-oﬀ to
endogenize the pattern of entry in a strategic setting.
One scenario where cost lowering externalities are likely to be significant is
when firms make decisions regarding entry into foreign markets. For example,
China recently underwent significant economic liberalization and foreign firms
are not particularly well informed about the Chinese market. The experience of
initial entrants into China can benefit subsequent entrants by helping them avoid
costly mistakes.1 By transferring technology, training workers, and setting up
research centers in China, initial investors may also lower the cost of establishing
subsidiaries for future investors by making it easier for them to locate qualified
personnel, local suppliers, and partners for joint ventures.2
Cost-lowering externalities may also arise when firms introduce a product
about which consumers lack information: promotional eﬀorts (advertising and
introductory sales etc.) by the first entrant serve the important function of informing consumers about the nature of the product and benefit future entrants
by lowering their corresponding expenditures. For example, when it first began
service, Federal Express invested heavily in conveying to consumers the meaning
of absolutely-positively overnight delivery whereas other overnight delivery firms
that entered after FedEx did not have to make similar investments.
To capture the above ideas and study the eﬀect of a “wait-and-see” strategy
on equilibrium entry patterns, we construct a model in which two firms simultaneously choose their timing of entry into a market. In accordance with the
motivation of the paper, we assume that the first firm’s entry results in positive
externalities that lower the second entrant’s cost of entry. Furthermore, the cost
1

Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison (1997) find empirical evidence that multinational firms who
penetrate foreign markets reduce entry costs for other potential entrants.
2
For example, while negotiating its entry into the Chinese market, Chubb Corporation,
agreed to set up an ‘insurance university’ in return for market access. In the automobile industry,
General Motors Corporation has been involved in similar eﬀorts (Business Week, 1996).
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reduction enjoyed by the second entrant increases continuously with the firm’s
waiting time. That is, the longer the second entrant delays its entry, the more
it learns about the new market environment from studying the first entrant’s experience, and the lower its entry cost. However, while the second entrant pays a
lower entry cost, delayed entry also means forgone profits. This trade-oﬀ between
a lower entry cost and foregone profits can generate simultaneous or sequential
entry equilibria for diﬀerent parameter values. When foregone profits are big
relative to the cost lowering externality, simultaneous entry is the unique equilibrium. When the converse is true, we obtain a sequential entry equilibrium where
the first firm jumps into the market instantaneously whereas the second firm enters after an optimal waiting period. Although the second entrant pays a lower
entry cost, it receives a lower lifetime payoﬀ in equilibrium than the first entrant.
The sequential entry equilibrium also exhibits some interesting comparative statics which stem from one common mechanism: factors that delay the second firm’s
entry confer an indirect benefit upon the initial entrant by extending its monopoly
status. Consequently, stronger positive externalities or a higher entry cost may
increase the first entrant’s payoﬀ.
When firms are asymmetric in terms of their marginal costs of production, an
important question is whether the low-cost firm necessarily enters first. Intuition
suggests that since it faces a higher opportunity cost of waiting, the low-cost firm
has a greater incentive to enter first. However, given that the high-cost firm enters
first, it may be in the interest of the low-cost firm to delay entry because of the
positive externality from initial entry. Our model shows that whenever the highcost firm entering first is a Nash equilibrium, the low-cost firm entering first is also
a Nash equilibrium. In addition, we isolate a range of parameter values for which
the low-cost firm entering first is the only equilibrium. Therefore, we claim that
the sequential entry equilibrium in which the low-cost firm entering first is more
likely.3 It is also shown that total industry profits are higher when the low-cost
3

A casual perusal of the empirical evidence regarding foreign investment suggests that bigger
firms usually do enter foreign markets first.
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firm enters first.
We also investigate socially desirable entry times and show that, relative to the
social optimum, the second firm does not necessarily enter too late. Whether or
not its entry time exceeds the socially optimal entry time depends upon whether
the additional social surplus (social incentive for entry) generated by its entry
exceeds the second entrant’s share of duopoly profits (private incentive for entry).
Endogenous pattern of entry has received some attention in recent literature,
but most existing work focuses on the demand side. Appelbaum and Weber (1994)
develop a model in which two firms simultaneously choose between entering a market early versus later in the face of demand uncertainty.4 Maggi (1996) analyzes
strategic investment in a new market also under demand uncertainty, where firms
face a trade-oﬀ between commitment and flexibility. Our paper diﬀers from these
work in three main respects. First, whereas in these models, the advantage of
being late stems from the resolution of uncertainty at the end of the first period
(therefore this advantage is independent of the players’ strategies), in our model
a firm benefits from delaying entry only if its rival enters before it. Second, we
determine entry times endogenously as opposed to the two period framework utilized in the literature. This feature of our model permits an investigation of the
properties of the optimal waiting period. Finally, we also consider entry decisions of asymmetric firms, something that has not received much attention in the
literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the basic model.
In section 3, we derive the equilibrium entry patterns and study their properties.
Next, in section 4, we consider the case of asymmetric firms. Section 5 examines
whether private entry times diﬀer from socially optimal ones. Section 6 concludes.
4

See Rob (1990 and 1992) for analyses of informational externalities that reveal the state of
demand to potential entrants in a dynamic competitive model.
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2. The Basic Model
There are two identical firms who simultaneously choose their time of entry into
a market at t = 0. We assume that firms are able to commit to their entry times.
Denote firm i’s entry time by ti , 0 ≤ ti < ∞, i = 1, 2. Firm i’s entry cost is given
by
Fi =

(

F
F e−γ(ti −tj )

if ti ≤ tj
if ti > tj

)

That is, if firm i enters the market before firm j, then it pays a fixed cost
F. If, however, it enters the market after firm j then it pays a lower entry cost
F e−γ(ti −tj ) , where γ > 0 is the externality parameter. Our formulation above
captures the notion that the second firm to enter pays a lower cost of entry
because of externalities generated by the first firm’s entry and the longer it waits,
the lower its cost of entry. Note that the cost of entry depends upon the relative
entry times of the two firms and does not exogenously decline over time and
that the marginal value of waiting declines with time. This formulation is to be
contrasted with the technology adoption literature where adoption cost declines
exogenously over time (see Reinganum, 1981a, 1981b).
If a firm enters first, it earns flow monopoly profits (denoted by m) till the
other firm enters. When both firms are in the market, each earns flow duopoly
profits denoted by π. For a given pair (t1 , t2 ), let Vi (t1 , t2 ) denote firm i’s sum of
discounted profits, and ρ the discount factor. We have
−ρti

Vi (t1 , t2 ) = e

"

#

"

#

π
− F e−γ(ti −tj )
ρ

#

m
π − m −ρtj
e
−F +
ρ
ρ

if ti < tj

(2.1)

and
−ρti

Vi (t1 , t2 ) = e
Assumption 1

"

π > ρF.
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if ti ≥ tj .

(2.2)

The above assumption implies that simultaneous entry is profitable for both
firms and it must hold for simultaneous entry to be even a possibility.

3. Equilibrium Entry Patterns
First note that if t1 ≥ t2 ,
i
∂V1 (t1 , t2 ) h
= −π + (ρ + γ)F e−γ(t1 −t2 ) e−ρt1
∂t1

(3.1)

∂V1 (t1 , t2 )
= [−m + ρF ] e−ρt1 < 0
∂t1

(3.2)

So, if π ≥ (ρ + γ)F, V1 (t1 , t2 ) decreases with t1 when t1 ≥ t2 . In this case, firm
1 does not benefit from waiting; the magnitude of the positive externality (γ) is
too small relative to the duopoly profit π. Consequently, firm 1 chooses to enter
no later than firm 2.
Further, note that if t1 < t2 ,

Under Assumption 1, V1 (t1 , t2 ) is strictly decreasing in t1 for t1 ≤ t2 . That is,
if firm 1 enters no later than firm 2, it enters at t = 0. Since a firm’s entry cost
declines only if its rival enters before it, the first entrant has no incentive to delay
its entry.
Therefore, if π ≥ (ρ + γ)F , ti = 0 is a (strictly) dominant strategy for both
firms and simultaneous entry at time 0 is the unique Nash equilibrium. On the
1 (0,0)
≤ 0, which is
other hand, if (0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium, it must be that ∂V∂t
1
equivalent to π ≥ (ρ + γ)F by equation (3.1). The following result then obtains.
Proposition 1: Simultaneous entry by both firms at t = 0 is the unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if π ≥ (ρ + γ)F .
The intuition for this result is clear. Given that its rival enters at t = 0, each
firm faces the decision of either entering at t = 0 or delaying entry to lower its
entry cost. The marginal benefit of delaying entry by a small time dt is given
by (ρ + γ)F — the reduction in cost of entry. The marginal cost of postponing
6

entry equals instantaneous duopoly profits π. When π ≥ (ρ + γ)F waiting is
not worthwhile for the firms since the loss in profits incurred by delaying entry
dominates the cost savings enjoyed due to decrease in entry cost.
It is clear then that the sequential entry equilibrium can be obtained only when
duopoly profits post entry are small relative to the magnitude of the externality
and the cost of entry. Therefore, next we consider the case where π < (ρ + γ)F.
Suppose that the first entrant enters at time t1 . By (3.1) and symmetry of
firms, if t2 > t1 , we have
∂V2 (t1 , t2 )
= 0 ⇒ π = (ρ + γ)F e−γ(t2 −t1 )
(3.3)
∂t2
Note that the marginal benefit of waiting declines over time whereas the marginal
cost of waiting is constant. Therefore, when the marginal benefit of waiting equals
the marginal cost, the second firm enters the market. Equation (3.3) can be solved
for the optimal waiting period t∗ :
"

F (ρ + γ)
1
t = ln
γ
π
∗

#

(3.4)

The optimal waiting time t∗ increases in F : a higher entry cost justifies a longer
waiting period on the part of the second entrant. Also, t∗ shrinks with π since
the opportunity cost of waiting increases as π goes up. The positive externality
parameter γ has an interesting eﬀect on t∗ . On the one hand, a larger γ makes
waiting more attractive since the longer the firm waits the lower its cost of entry.
On the other hand, a larger γ leads to a lower cost of entry at any given point in
∗
1
= γ1 [ ρ+γ
− t∗ ],
time thereby making entry more attractive. Specifically, since dt
dγ
∗
1
> 0 if and only if t∗ < ρ+γ
. For small γ, t∗ increases with γ.
it follows that dt
dγ
But if γ is relatively large, then t∗ decreases with γ.

7

Lemma 1: Suppose π < (ρ + γ)F. Then,
(i) V1 (0, t∗ ) > V2 (0, t∗ ); and
(ii) there exists a tb ∈ (0, ∞) such that firm i’s best response function, denoted
as R(tj ), is given by


 tj

R(tj ) = 
Proof: We know that
∗

V2 ≡ e−ρt
where t∗ =

1
γ

ln

h

(ρ+γ)F
π

i
∗

π
F (ρ+γ)

0

if

tj >

tb




.

π
∗
∗ m
∗π
− F e−(ρ+γ)t and V1 ≡ (1 − e−ρt ) + e−ρt − F
ρ
ρ
ρ
. We have

V1 − V2 = (1 − e−ρt )
where x ≡





if 0 ≤ tj ≤ tb 


+ t∗

m
m
∗
− F (1 − e−(ρ+γ)t ) = (1 − xρ/γ ) − F (1 − xρ/γ+1 ),
ρ
ρ

< 1. Thus,

1
1
d(V1 − V2 )
= − xρ/r−1 [m − F (ρ + γ)x] = − xρ/r−1 [m − π] < 0.
dx
γ
γ
This, together with the fact that V1 = V2 when x = 1, implies V1 > V2 for all
0 < x < 1. This proves part (i) of the lemma.
Clearly, if firm i enters after firm j, it enters at time tj + t∗ , and if it enters
before firm j, it enters at t = 0. Which of the two options is better depends on the
relative magnitudes of Vi (0, tj ) and Vi (tj + t∗ , tj ). At tj = 0, Vi (0, 0) < Vi (t∗ , 0), by
the definition of t∗ . Since Vi (0, tj ) increases with tj , whereas Vi (tj +t∗ , tj ) decreases
with it and approaches zero as tj goes to +∞, there exists 0 < tb < ∞ such that
b = Vi (tb + t∗ , t).
b Thus, Vi (0, tj ) < Vi (tj + t∗ , tj ) iﬀ tj < t.
b
Vi (0, t)
While the first entrant earns monopoly profits till the second firms enters, the
second entrant incurs a lower entry cost due to the positive externality generated
by γ. Part (i) of Lemma 1 shows that the first entrant receives a higher payoﬀ
8

than the second. This result is later used to prove the existence of a sequential
entry equilibrium.5
The properties of the reaction functions are also easy to understand. If firm j
enters at time 0, then firm i will choose to enter at t∗ in order to take advantage
of the positive externality. If firm j enters relatively early (i.e., tj is small), firm
i still prefers to delay entry by time t∗ and enters at time tj + t∗ , as long as tj is
b However, if tj > t,
b it is not worthwhile for firm i to delay
before a critical time t.
entry till tj + t∗ and it prefers to enter at ti = 0 to capture the flow profit from
b firm
time 0. There exists a critical time tb such that, given firm j enters at time t,
b where tb is
i is indiﬀerent between entering at time 0 and waiting till time tb + t,
b = V1 (tb + t∗ , t).
b
defined by equation V1 (0, t)
A sequential entry equilibrium must involve the first entrant entering at t = 0
(from (3.2)). If firm 1 enters at t = 0 then firm 2’s optimal response is to enter at
t∗ . If firm 2 enters at t∗ , firm 1 has two options: It either enters before t∗ , in which
case it enters at time 0 and receives a life-time payoﬀ of V1 (0, t∗ ). Alternatively,
firm 1 can enter after t∗ , in which case it enters at 2t∗ and earns a payoﬀ of
∗
V1 (2t∗ , t∗ ). Since V1 (2t∗ , t∗ ) = e−ρt V2 (0, t∗ ) and from part (i) of lemma 1 we know
that V1 (0, t∗ ) > V2 (0, t∗ ). Thus, V1 (0, t∗ ) > V1 (2t∗ , t∗ ).6 Therefore, t1 = 0 is the
best response to t2 = t∗ and consequently (0, t∗ ) is a Nash equilibrium.
5
Another interesting point is that the first entrant may benefit from an increase in the entry
cost (F ). This is because a higher entry cost implies a longer waiting period on the part of the
second entrant (see equation 3.4) and therefore a longer monopoly reign for the first entrant.
To see this, note that
∗
∗ dt
dV1 (0, t∗ )
= (m − π)e−ρt
−1
dF
dF
so that an increase in F has a direct negative eﬀect (captured by −1) and an indirect positive
∗
eﬀect (captured by the first term since dt
dF > 0) on V1 . Using equation (3.4), we have:

¸ γρ
·
(m − π)
π
dV1 (0, t∗ )
=
−1
ρ
dF
γF 1+ γ ρ + γ
Thus, the indirect eﬀect may dominate the direct negative eﬀect when the monopoly flow profit
m is large (or when F is small).
6
t.
This means that t∗ is always greater than the critical value b
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Proposition 2: If ρF < π < (ρ + γ)F, a unique equilibrium entry pattern exists
in which one firm enters at time 0 and the other at time t∗ .
The intuition behind Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 is simple: Firms enter
simultaneously at date t = 0 if the positive externality is not strong (so that
(ρ + γ)F < π)). Otherwise, one firm delays its entry in order to enjoy the positive
externality conferred by the entry of its rival.

4. Asymmetric Firms
Suppose that the two firms diﬀer in their marginal costs of production: firm 1
has a lower marginal cost of production than firm 2. Let π1 and π 2 denote each
firm’s flow duopoly profits where π 1 ≥ π 2 and mi denote each firm’s monopoly
profits where m1 ≥ m2 . Similar to Assumption 1, let π 2 > ρF . When firms
are asymmetric, their incentives for entry do not coincide. In particular, the
opportunity costs of delaying entry are higher for the low-cost firm: it forgoes
m1 ≥ m2 for every instant it delays its entry given that firm 2 has not entered
yet. One thus expects that it is more likely that the low-cost firm enters first.
4.1. Pattern of Entry
As before, when each firm’s flow duopoly profits exceed the threshold (ρ + γ)F ,
the cost-lowering externalities are not large enough to induce either firm to delay
entry, so to enter at time 0 is the dominant strategy for each firm. When π 1 >
(ρ + γ)F > π 2 , the cost-lowering externalities are not large enough for firm 1 to
delay entry, but are suﬃcient for firm 2 to wait. In this case, to enter at t1 = 0
is still the dominant strategy for firm 1. Given this, firm 2 enters at its optimal
h
i
. The following result thus obtains.
time t∗2 = γ1 ln F (ρ+γ)
π2
Proposition 3: If π2 > (ρ + γ)F simultaneous entry at t = 0 is the unique Nash
equilibrium. If π 2 < (ρ + γ)F < π 1 then (0, t∗2 ) is the only Nash equilibrium.
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When π 1 < (ρ + γ)F , both firms find delaying entry worthwhile. As a result,
there may exist two diﬀerent kinds of equilibria: one in which firm 1 enters first
and the other in which it enters second. As in the previous section, given that firm
j enters at time t∗j , for firm i to be the first to enter in equilibrium, it must be that
its payoﬀ of entering at ti = 0 exceeds the payoﬀ it would receive if it waits (after
firm j’s entry) for its optimal delay time and then enters at time t∗j + t∗i , where
h
i
t∗k = γ1 ln F (ρ+γ)
, k = 1, 2. Since firms are asymmetric, the conditions under
πk
which this restriction on payoﬀs is satisfied also diﬀer. But, because delaying
entry is relatively more costly for firm 1, we can show that whenever the benefits
of delaying entry are suﬃcient for firm 1 to enter later, they are also suﬃcient for
delaying firm 2’s entry.
Proposition 4: Let π2 ≤ π 1 < (ρ + γ)F. If (t∗1 , 0) is a Nash equilibrium, then
(0, t∗2 ) is a Nash equilibrium as well.
Proof. Let ∆1 ≡ V1 (0, t∗2 ) − V1 (t∗1 + t∗2 , t∗2 ) and ∆2 ≡ V2 (t∗1 , 0) − V2 (t∗1 , t∗1 + t∗2 ).
By definition,
∗
i
i
h
i
1h
e−ρt2 h
∗
∗
∗
∗
−ρt∗2
1−e
m1 +
1 − e−ρt1 π1 − F 1 − e−ρ(t1 +t2 )−γt1
∆1 =
ρ
ρ

and
∗
i
i
h
i
1h
e−ρt1 h
∗
∗
∗
∗
−ρt∗1
∆2 =
1−e
m2 +
1 − e−ρt2 π2 − F 1 − e−ρ(t1 +t2 )−γt2
ρ
ρ

For (t∗1 , 0) to be a Nash equilibrium, there must be ∆2 ≥ 0 and for (0, t∗2 ) to
be a Nash equilibrium, there must be ∆1 ≥ 0. Since t∗1 < t∗2 and π 1 ≥ π 2 and
m1 ≥ m2 , the first two terms of ∆1 are greater than the corresponding terms of
∆2 , and the third term of ∆1 is smaller than the corresponding term of ∆2 . As a
result, ∆1 ≥ ∆2 . Consequently, if (t∗1 , 0) is a Nash equilibrium, so is (0, t∗2 ).
Figure 1 below illustrates equilibrium outcomes for both the asymmetric case
and the symmetric case. The figure is plotted in the (π 1 , π2 ) space. The symmetric
case is represented on the 45 degree line. In area ABC, both (0, t∗2 ) and (t∗1 , 0)
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could be Nash equilibria. To the right of BC and below CD, only (0, t∗2 ) is a Nash
equilibrium and in the area above CD and below the 45 degree line, simultaneous
entry is the Nash equilibrium. Since the region in which sequential entry occurs
with the low-cost firm entering first contains the region in which the high-cost
firm enters first, our results show that the low-cost firm is more likely to enter
first in our model.
– Insert figure 1 here –
4.2. Industry Profits under Sequential Entry
The question we address here is the following: among the two Nash equilibria
(0, t∗2 ) and (t∗1 , 0), which one leads to higher industry profits?
Let V (0, t∗2 ) and V (t∗1 , 0) denote the industry profits in these two equilibria,
respectively. We have
∗

V

(0, t∗2 )

=

Zt2

−ρt

e

m1 dt +

+∞
Z

h

+∞
Z

h

t∗2

0

∗

e−ρt [π 1 + π 2 ] dt − F 1 + e−(ρ+γ)t2

i

and
∗

V

(t∗1 , 0)

=

Zt1
0

−ρt

e

m2 dt +

t∗1

∗

e−ρt [π 1 + π 2 ] dt − F 1 + e−(ρ+γ)t1

i

Since t∗2 ≥ t∗1 , m1 ≥ m2 and m1 > [π 1 + π 2 ], it must be that V (0, t∗2 ) > V (t∗1 , 0).
That is, total industry profits are higher in the sequential equilibrium in which the
low-cost firm enters first. This is so because of three reasons. First, since m1 ≥ m2 ,
the low-cost monopolist makes higher profits till the second firm enters. Second,
since t∗2 ≥ t∗1 monopoly position is maintained longer in equilibrium (0, t∗2 ) than in
(t∗1 , 0). Finally, entry cost that is paid in equilibrium (0, t∗2 ) is lower because the
high-cost firm stays out of the market for a longer time and pays a lower entry
cost. Hence, if the two firms could make side payments, we would expect the
low-cost firm to enter first.
12

5. Welfare Analysis
Regarding the welfare properties of diﬀerent entry patterns that exist in this
model, one can ask two types of questions. First, do firms enter too early or too
late from society’s standpoint? Second, when firms diﬀer in cost, is it necessarily
the case that social welfare is higher when the low-cost firm enters first?.
First, regarding entry times, it is clear that in simultaneous entry equilibrium,
firms never enter too early in this model. This is because firms internalize the
benefits of delaying entry and if they prefer not to delay entry, neither does society.
In a given sequential entry equilibrium, say (0, t∗2 ), is t∗2 is the socially optimal
waiting period? Given that firm 1 enters at t = 0, the socially optimal entry time
of firm 2 is given by:
ts ≡ ArgMax W (t) = V1 (0, t) + V2 (0, t) +
t

Zt
0

−ρt

e

C1 dt +

+∞
Z

e−ρt C2 dt

t

where C1 denotes the consumer surplus when only firm 1 is in the market and
C2 is the consumer surplus under duopoly. We can write W (t) as W (t) =
h
i
1
e−ρt Λρ − F e−γt + m1 +C
− F, where Λ ≡ π 1 + π 2 + C2 − m1 − C1 is the amount
ρ
by which total surplus under duopoly exceeds the total surplus under monopoly.
h
i
. ComTaking the first order condition and solving for ts we get ts = γ1 ln F (ρ+γ)
Λ
paring ts with t∗2 we find that t∗2 ≥ ts if and only if Λ ≥ π 2 .
Proposition 5: In a sequential entry equilibrium, the second firm enters too late
if and only if Λ ≥ π 2 .
There are two opposing forces that aﬀect the private entry time vis-a-vis the
socially optimal entry time. On the one hand, when delaying its entry the second
entrant does not take into account the additional consumer surplus that is generated as a result of its entry. On the other hand, the second entrant also fails
to take into account the fact that its entry erodes the first entrant’s monopoly
status. In general, either of those two eﬀects can dominate. For linear demand
P = A − Q and symmetric (Cournot) firms with zero production cost, it follows
13

that m1 = m2 = A2 /4, C1 = A2 /8, π1 = π 2 = A2 /9, and C2 = 2A2 /9. As a result,
Λ = 5A2 /72 < π. Thus, the second firm enters too early in this case.
If the firms are asymmetric, either of them may enter first in equilibrium.
When the low-cost firm enters first (in the equilibrium (0, t∗2 )), the flow monopoly
profit and consumer surplus prior to the second firm’s entry are higher than in the
equilibrium (t∗1 , 0) where the high-cost firm enters first. Also, since t∗2 > t∗1 , entry
cost is lower in the first equilibrium as the high-cost firm waits longer before its
entry in order to take the advantage of positive externality generated by the lowcost firm’s entry. However, for the same reason, monopoly position is maintained
for a longer period of time in the first equilibrium. In general, it is hard to rank
these two equilibria in terms of social welfare.7

6. Conclusion
In this paper we endogenize the pattern of entry where initial entry generates
positive externalities for other potential entrants. We derive conditions which
lead to simultaneous or sequential entry and demonstrate the robustness of the
results when the firms diﬀer in cost. Our model provides several new insights. For
symmetric firms, an increase in entry cost may actually benefit the first entrant
since it delays entry by its rival firm (see footnote 5). Furthermore, the optimal
entry time of the second firm is not monotonic in the magnitude of the externality
from the first firm’s entry. Under the asymmetric case we show that while there
is no guarantee that the low-cost firm enters the market first (socially desirable),
it is nevertheless the case that the low-cost firm is more likely to enter before the
high-cost firm. We also find that the optimal entry time of the second entrant
does not necessarily exceed the socially optimal entry time, as might be expected
in the face of a positive externality.
An important assumption made in our model is that firms are able to com7

Simulations results for linear demand indicate that for various combinations of parameter
values (the cost diﬀerential between the two firms, the magnitude of γ, the fixed entry cost F ,
and the discount factor ρ), social welfare is higher when the low-cost firm enters first.
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mit to their entry times at t = 0. This commitment assumption simplifies the
derivations of the equilibrium entry patterns and enables us to focus on the basic
trade-oﬀ between entering first and earning monopoly profit versus delaying entry
to lower the cost of entry. In Lin and Saggi (2001), we extend our model to a
dynamic game where firms are unable to commit to entry times.8 We show that
the results obtained in the present model are not an artifact of the commitment
assumption: the simultaneous entry and sequential entry equilibria obtained in
this model are also subgame perfect equilibria in the dynamic model. The dynamic
model does oﬀer one additional insight though. In a dynamic setting, there exists
a coordination problem between firms: the incentive to enter first coupled with
the incentive to avoid simultaneous entry can result in a Pareto-inferior equilibrium in which each firm chooses not to enter with a positive probability in each
time period t, conditional on no entry by that time. If firms could coordinate their
entry decisions, they would choose the entry pattern described by the sequential
entry equilibrium of our model.
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